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In the

Supreme Court of the State of Utah
THOMAS B. MOONEY,
Plaintiff and Appellant,

vs.

Case No.
7373

THE DENVER AND RIO GRANDE
WESTERN RAILROAD COMPANY,
Defendant and Respondent.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF FACTS

Although the appellant's "statement of case" includes
some of the facts, it is argumentative in form, and misstates
and omits many important parts of the record. It is necessary, therefore, for respondent to restate to some extent
the facts outlined by appellant and also to set forth the
omitted references.
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The plaintiff, Thomas B. Mooney, a citizen and resident of the City and County of Denver, Colorado, filed a
complaint in this case in the Third Judicial District Court
of Salt Lake County, State of Utah, on May 31, 1949 (R.
1-6). The complaint named as defendant, The Denver and
Rio Grande Western Railroad Company, a foreign corporation authorized to do business in the State of Utah. The
plaintiff alleged a cause of action under the Federal Employers' Liability Act, 45 U. S. C. A. Sec. 51, and the
Safety Appliance Act, 45 U. S. C. A. Sec. 11, on account of
an accident and injuries occurring in the State of Colorado
on January 5, 1949 (R. 1-2). In response to this complaint,
the defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss upon the basis of
forum non conveniens (R. 9-15). The Motion to Dismiss
was filed June 20, 1949, and set forth the grounds for dismissal in considerable detail, and in addition was supported
by an affidavit of counsel covering substantially the same
factual allegations (R. 12-15). Thereafter, plaintiff's counsel "noticed" for hearing the Motion to Dismiss before the
trial court at 2:00P.M. on June 27, 1949 (R. 16). During
the noon hour (R. 41) on the same day as the scheduled
hearing, plaintiff served upon defendant's counsel a document entitled "Answer In Opposition To Motion To Dismiss" (R. 17), which admitted and denied various of the
facts set forth in the affidavit supporting the defendant's
motion.

That

:::: th:

At the scheduled hearing at 2 :00 P. M. that day, counsel for defendant called to the attention of the trial court
the fact that plaintiff had only just served a counter affidavit apparently traversing the facts contained in de-

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

3

fendant's affidavit, and the trial court was asked to continue the hearing to a later date in order that the defendant might present witnesses to support its position (R. 41).
In the alternative, defense counsel indicated his willingness
to proceed at once by testifying himself to the facts contained in the defendant's affidavit upon the basis of information and belief, provided plaintiff's counsel would
waive objections to the competancy of such proof (R. 41).
Mr. B. E. Roberts, one of the attorneys for the plaintiff,
immediately replied that he had "no objection to that at
all" (R. 41). On the basis of this understanding, Mr. Clifford L. Ashton, one of the attorneys for the defendant, thereupon took the witness-stand and upon the basis of information and belief, testified as follows (R. 41-53) :
That he was one of the attorneys representing the defendant; that he had signed the defendant's affidavit in
support of the Motion to Dismiss (R. 41). In order for the
defendant to present its position at the trial of the case,
it would be necessary to bring to Salt Lake City from
Colorado an estimated number of ten witnesses; that these
witnesses consisted of the train crew members and three
doctors who had examined the plaintiff (R. 42). All ten
witnesses resided in Colorado within convenient distance
to both federal and district courts located in Denver, Colorado; that both of such courts in Denver had jurisdiction
of the cause of action alleged by the plaintiff. Denver was
located approximately 570 miles from Salt Lake City. The
Colorado witnesses referred to, including the three doctors
(and there might be four doctors, depending on the plaintiff's case) could not be compelled to come to Salt Lake City
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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to testify. No process was available to the defendant to
compel the attendance of these witnesses; that their attendance could be obtained only by meeting their own terms
of compensation and expense allowances. The cost of procuring the personal attendance of these witnesses in Salt
Lake County would be expensive and burdensome to the
defendant, and would represent costs which could not be
recovered by the defendant even in the event defendant were
successful in the defense of the action (R. 43). If the witnesses resided within the jurisdiction of the courts of the
Third Judicial District of Salt Lake County, the defendant
could subpoena them and the amount which would be paid
them as witnesses would be the amount permitted by the
state law and would be recoverable in the event the defendant should win the suit, but if the defendant had to bring
these, witnesse_$ from Colorado on their own terms, they
could ·not be secured for a trial in Salt Lake City except
by paying them a reasonable amount per day, plus travel
expenses and other costs. The present case could not be adequately or understandingly tried without the presence of the
ten witnesses referred to. It would be unsatisfactory substitute for these witnesses to use depositions taken in another state, because the jurors and the court can not see
the witnesses or determine their credibility and the weight
which should be given to their testimony (R. 44). If this
case were tried in Salt Lake City instead of Colorado where
the accident occurred, it would be impossible for the jury to
view the Safety Appliance equipment allegedly involved in
the accident, and it might become very material at the trial
for the jury to examine this equipment. Of course, the

): ·
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equipment located and maintained in Colorado might be
brought to Salt Lake City, but it would be an added expense
not recoverable by the defendant (R. 44). Of the ten witnesses desired by the defendant, at least three are practicing
physicians and doctors who reside in Colorado; that these
doctors are not employed by the defendant, but by an
association of railroad employees. The defendant has no
control over these doctors by reason of their employment
relationship. The defendant can not secure the presence of
these doctors in Salt Lake City without meeting their professional terms (R. 45). The defendant estimates that the
cost of obtaining the attendance of the ten witnesses referred to, of transporting them to Salt Lake City and of
paying their travel and maintenance expenses and compensating them for their services would approximate $1,500;
that the witness asked his office to prepare an estimate of
this cost for him, and the estimate prepared was slightly
larger than the figure of $1,500, but in order to be within
a safe limit, the witness reduced the estimate to $1,500 (R.
45). In addition, the trial of this case in Salt Lake County
would further add to the congestion of the calendar of that
court and would delay the trial of cases involving local
residents and citizens and local problems of pressing importance (R. 46); that the court was more informed about
this congestion than the witness and probably would take
judicial notice of it. It was a fact at the present time that
the trial courts hearing cases in the District Court of Salt
Lake County were unable to handle all the cases set. The
taxpayers of this state were required to wait an undue length
of time for cases to be tried, because many cases were
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brought into this jurisdiction from outside the state, that :i~rn
is, the cases were brought from another state where the "~oOI
alleged accident happened and where all the witnesses resided. The local juries of this state were required to bear
the burden of jury service in a controversy which had no
relationship to this state or community, and the courts of
this state were required to pay the expense of litigation far ~~0001
removed from the point of its origin (R. 47).

t

Upon cross examination by plaintiff's counsel, the ~n~n
witness Ashton further testified : That the defendant's -~~in£
Claim Department in Colorado had made an investigation /!Da,t 1
of this case and had referred to the attention of the wit- ,lammg
ness' office the names of all witnesses present at the time ~ o.
of the plaintiff's alleged accident, who saw the equipment ~cm~lo:
alleged to be defective, and who talked to the plaintiff clotesl
immediately before and after his alleged injury (R. 48). ~lioulu
The witness was unable to state the names of the ten wit- 'l.l1naol
nesses at the moment, because the claim file had been re- ::~d
turned to Denver, but it would be quite easy to secure the MDaVI
names from Claim Department in Denver. The ten witnesses
ll!lhaJ
referred to all were witnesses to things material to the case;
.<Iidena
that the seven train crew witnesses would testify to the con- l
1
dition of the alleged defective brake and the alleged unsafe
:i1rtau
condition of the equipment where the brake was located; that
all seven witnesses were present and were able so to testify.
Whether all seven witnesses will be called to testify would depend a great deal on the testimony produced by the plaintiff;
that defendant certainly would have to have the witnesses
~'·
present at the trial until after the plaintiff had rested his
case (R. 49). The witness could not state the names of the

' !8
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three doctors required as witnesses, but their names were
easily obtainable; that the doctors would testify to their examination of the plaintiff. Their testimony might be cumulative, but as a matter of fact the witness thought it would not
be (R. 50). The claim file now in Denver had been examined
by the witness before he prepared the affidavit in support of
the Motion to Dismiss. The three doctors mentioned saw
the plaintiff on different occasions; that the defendant
would not want to try this case without having all three
doctors present in court so that they could be called as witnesses in the event it became necessary (R. 51). It was not
true that the only difference between trying the case in
Denver instead of Salt Lake, so far as costs were concerned,
consisted of the matter of transportation. Whenever railroad employees were brought from Colorado to the State of
Utah to testify they were paid not only the amount of money
they would have earned if they had worked that day, but also
a reasonable amount to compensate them for food and lodging while in Salt Lake; that in every case the wages they
would have earned at their regular employment would be
larger than the statutory witness fee (R. 51). Of course,
the defendant would have to pay the wages of employees
called as witnesses even if the case were tried in Denver,
but certainly three or four days time would be saved if the
case were tried in Denver (R. 52). The doctors would have
to be paid their professional fee while absent from Denver,
and three or four days consumed in travel and waiting upon
a trial can cost a lot of money with doctors. It was the
witness' understanding that a doctor called as a witness

:d:
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received $50 a day from the time he left Colorado until he
returned. The defendant had been able to secure doctors
as witness~s in other cases if these terms were met; the
same was true of employee witnesses; that depositions of
out of state witnesses could be taken (R. 52).
No evidence or testimony of any kind was offered on
behalf of the plaintiff at the hearing (R. 53). The denials
and allegations contained in the plaintiff's "Answer In Opposition To Motion To Dismiss" were not supported in any
manner. The controverted factual and legal questions were
then argued to the trial court by counsel for both parties
(R. 53). Thereafter, the trial court granted the defendant's
Motion to Dismiss (R. 53). Two days later, on June 29, 1949,
the court entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law (R. 21-27). The Findings of Fact found the controverted factual issues in favor of the defendant, substantially
as set forth in defendant's supporting affidavit and as testified to at the hearing by defendant's counsel. The trial
court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law were as
follows (R. 21-26) :
"The above entitled matter coming on regularly
to be heard before the above entitled court on the
27th day of June, 1949, upon the defendant's motion
to dismiss the complaint of the plaintiff on file herein, and upon the plaintiff's ans)Ver in opposition to
the said motion to dismiss. The defendant introduced
evidence in support of the issues raised by its affidavit in support of its motion and by plaintiff's answer thereto. No evidence was offered or introduced
by the plaintiff. The court having fully considered
the pleadings, the evidence, and the arguments of
counsel for the respective parties, and being fully
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advised in the premises, now makes and enters its
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law as follows:
"FINDINGS OF FACT
"1. Clifford L. Ashton is one of the attorneys
for the defendant The Denver and Rio Grande Western Railroad Company, and in such capacity is familiar with the facts and circumstances connected
with the above entitled cause of action filed by the
plaintiff herein.
"2. The cause of action referred to in the plaintiff's complaint and on account of which damages are
claimed by the plaintiff, arose out of an alleged accident and alleged injuries whieh occurred on January
5, 1949, in the State of Colorado. The plaintiff named
in said complaint is now and at the time of the alleged accident and injuries was a citizen and resident of the City and County of Denver, State of Colorado.
"3. The defendant, The Denver and Rio Grande
Western Railroad Company, is a citizen of the State
of Delaware, but operates a line of railroad in Colorado and Utah. The defendant's general offices and
headquarters are located in Denver, Colorado, and
the major portion of its business is located in and
carried on within the State of Colorado. Defendant
does business within the State of Utah only as a foreign corporation.
"4. Plaintiff's alleged cause of action is brought
under the provisions of the Federal Employers' Liability Act, 45, U. S. C. A. Sec. 51, and the Safety Appliance Act, 45 U. S. C. A. Sec. 11, et seq. Both federal and state courts are located within the City and
County of Denver, Colorado, and at other convenient
places in the State of Colorado, and said courts are
open and have jurisdiction to entertain and adjud·Icate the plaintiff's alleged present cause of action if
said cause of action were filed in the courts of ColoSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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rado, and the general law applicable to the determination of plaintiff's alleged cause of action is the
same in Colorado as it is in the State of Utah.
"5. In order to try plaintiff's alleged cause of
action in the Third Judicial District Court of Salt
Lake County at Salt Lake City, Utah, it would be
necessary for the plaintiff to travel to Salt Lake City,
Utah, from Denver, Colorado, where he now resides.
In order for the defendant properly to defend said
action and present all the facts at a trial of the case
in Salt Lake City, Utah, it would be necessary for the
defendant to bring to Salt Lake City, Utah, from the
State of Colorado, an estimated number of ten witnesses. Each and all of these ten witnesses now and
at all times mentioned in the plaintiff's complaint
reside in and are citizens of the State of Colorado
and reside within a convenient distance to courts located in the City and County of Denver, Colorado.
Denver, Colorado, is located approximately 570 miles
from Salt Lake City, Utah.
"6. The aforesaid necessary witnesses for the
defendant cannot be compelled by judicial process to
come to Salt Lake City, Utah, and to testify in the
trial of this case and their attendance at a trial in
Salt Lake City can be obtained only by meeting
their own terms of compensation and expense allowances. The cost of procuring the personal attendance
of such witnesses in the courts of Salt Lake County
will be expensive and burdensome to the defendant.
The major portion of such costs cannot be recovered
by the defendant, even in the event the defendant
should be successful in the defense of the plaintiff's
action. The testimony of these necessary witnesses
residing in the State of Colorado cannot be adequately
presented and made intelligible to a jury, except by
oral testimony and explanation in the court room at
the time of trial. Such testimony cannot be adequately or understandably presented by witnesses testify-
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ing by deposition only or through written interrogatories, because of the inability of jurors to determine
intelligently the credibility of such unseen witnesses.
Under such circumstances, testimony and evidence by
deposition is frequently disregarded or given scant
consideration by jurors, even though such testimony
might be given full weight if presented orally in the
presence of the jury. Moreover, trial of this 'case
in Salt Lake City, Utah, instead of in the State of
Colorado where the alleged accident occurred, would
prevent a view by the jury of the premises, facilities
and instrumentalities involved, and thereby would
encourage and facilitate confusion, distortion and
misrepresentation of the pertinent facts incident to
the claims of both the plaintiff and the defendant.
"7. Of the estimated ten necessary witnesses
for the defendant, who reside in or near Denver, Colorado, at least three of said witnesses are practicing
physicians and doctors. The other seven witnesses
are railroad employees. The physicians and doctors
mentioned are actively engaged in their practices and
it would be difficult for the defendant to persuade
them to leave their practices, except upon the promise of substantial fees and remuneration. The estimated cost to the defendant of transporting these ten
necessary witnesses to Salt Lake City, Utah, of paying their travel and maintenance expenses, of compensating them for their services while absent from
their usual occupations, and of compensating other
persons to substitute for them in their customary
occupations, would amount to approximately $1500.00. The major portion of this expense could not be
recovered by the defendant in its cost bill, even in
the event the defendant were successful in the defense of this action. The burden of assuming this unnecessary cost and expense, places an undue and unfair hardship and disadvantage upon the defendant.
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"8. The trial of this case in this court will further add to the congestion of an already badly congested and crowded calendar in this court, and will
interfere with the orderly and efficient administration of justice in this court. The calendar of cases
set in the Third Judicial District Court of the State
of Utah in and for Salt Lake County for the month
of June, 1949, shows that a total of 165 civil cases
are at issue and set for trial. Only about half of this
total of cases can or will be disposed of by this court
during the month of June. The crowded condition
of the calendar also has necessitated the assignment
of an extra judge to this court from another Judicial
District of the state. The court calendar for the single month of June, 1949, also indicates that of the
total number of civil cases assigned for trial, 29 cases
involve personal injury suits against three different
railroad companies operating in the State of Utah.
Of this number, 17. cases were brought by non-resident plaintiffs, suing on actions arising outside the
State of Utah. In all17 cases, the non-resident plaintiffs are represented by the same law firm located
in Salt Lake City, Utah. The trial of this case in this
court will delay the trial of cases involving local residents and citizens and local problems of pressing importance. The trial of this and similar cases arising
out of events occurring in a state other than Utah,
and between parties who are non-residents of Utah,
increases the administrative costs of local courts of
Utah to the detriment of the citizens and taxpayers
of Utah, without the citizens and taxpayers of Utah
securing any commensurate benefits. Also, local juries of Utah are required to bear the burden of service
in a controversy which bears no relationship to their
State and community. The courts of the State of
Utah are required to pay the expense and bear the
burden of litigation far removed from its point of
origin.
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"9. The plaintiff's alleged cause of action can
conveniently be tried in the courts of Colorado, where
the accident complained of occurred, where the plaintiff now resides, where defendant has its headquarters and general offices, where all the necessary witnesses reside, and where the instrumentalities involved in connection with the alleged accident can be
viewed more readily.
"Pursuant to the foregoing Findings of Fact, the
court now draws the following

"CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
"1. This court has jurisdiction of the above entitled action, but it is not mandatory upon the court
to accept such juris diction.
"2. It is within the inherent power of this court
in its discretion to decline jurisdiction of litigation
on the basis of forum non conveniens between two
non-residents when its acceptance will and does interfere with its orderly and efficient administration
of justice, unnecessarily burdens the court, places an
unfair burden upon one or the other of the parties
to the litigation, and when such litigation can be conducted in an available forum in the state of plaintiff's
residence and where the accident occurred, which is
more conveniently located for the parties, and where
the elements of undue cost, vexation, frustration and
harassment to the parties do not exist.
"3. Defendant is entitled to have made and entered herein an order granting its motion to dismiss
the complaint of the plaintiff on file herein, without
prejudice to the right of the plaintiff to re-commence
or prosecute the same in any suitable or convenient
forum other than the above entitled court."

It will be noted that the foregoing Findings of Fact
follow the defendant's affidavit in support of defendant's
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Motion to Dismiss and the testimony of defendant's counsel
at the hearing, except for certain additional findings in
paragraph 8 with respect to the congested condition of the
calendar in the Third Judicial District Court for Salt Lake
County (R. 24-2'5). At the hearing on the Motion to Dismiss,
the trial court was requested to take judicial notice of the condition of the court calendar (R. 46). In compliance with such
request, at the time the trial judge ruled on the motion, he
specifically stated that he would take judicial notice of the
crowded condition of the calendar, adding that that was the
reason why he, a judge from another judicial district, was
present in Salt Lake for a three-day period (R. 53). The
Findings of Fact contained in paragraph 8 are matters of
public record, ascertainable from the records in the Clerk's
office of the Third Judicial District Court for Salt Lake
County. 1
After the trial court had signed its Findings of Fact
and Conclusions of Law, it thereafter entered on the same
day its formal Order, dismissing the plaintiff's complaint
without prejudice (R. 27). The next day, June 30, 1949, the
plaintiff served and filed a document entitled "Objections
to Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law" (R. 28-33).
At no time did the plaintiff ever "notice" for hearing his '
so-called "Objections" or request a ruling thereon by the
trial court. Instead, on the following day, July 1, 1949,
plaintiff served and filed a self-serving affidavit, intimat1

Courts of this state will take judicial notice of facts of public record.
See Utah Code Anno. (1943:), 104-46-1 (3), and Lehi Irr. Co. v. Jones,
.. Utah ... , 202 P. (2d) 892, 89'5. In State v. Bates 22 Utah 65, 68,
61 P. 905, it was said that "courts will generally tak~ notice of whatever ought to be generally known within the limits of their jurisdiction."
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ing that the trial judge had signed the Findings of Fact and

Conclusions of Law at a different time than had been indicated in some previous conversation which allegedly had
taken place between plaintiff's counsel and the court. Of
course, the defendant had no knowledge of any such ex
pa'rte conversations either then or now. At no time did the
plaintiff ask for any kind of reconsideration of the trial
court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, nor at any
time did the plaintiff request any ruling or disposition of
the document entitled "Objections to the Findings of Fact
and Conclusions of Law." Instead, at the same time and on
the same day as plaintiff's affidavit was served, the plaintiff filed its Notice of Appeal in this case (R. 36).
Throughout his brief the appellant makes many statements of alleged fact which are either entirely outside of
or contrary to the record in this case.
On page 5 of his brief, appellant attributes to the witness Ashton the statement that it would cost in excess of
$1,500 to bring the three doctor witnesses from Denver to
Salt Lake City. To the contrary, both the affidavit in support of the motion to dismiss which was signed by Ashton
(R. 14) and Ashton's oral testimony at the hearing made
it clear that the figure of $1,500 represented the estimated
cost of bringing ten witnesses, including the three doctors,
to Salt Lake City (R. 45-46). This estimated cost included
items of expense consisting of transportation, maintenance
and compensation for services (R. 45).
On page 22 of his brief, appellant states that the document entitled ''Objections to Findings of Fact and ConSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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elusions of Law" was supported by an affidavit of counsel,
Brigham E. Roberts. The fact, as shown by the record, is that
this affidavit was served the day following the. day on
which the "Objections" were served (R. 33, 35). The affidavit was filed along with the plaintiff's Notice of Appeal
(R. 36). The obvious purpose of this affidavit was not to
support the "Objections to the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law" but rather to make prejudicial and selfserving statements for inclusion in the record on appeal.
The affidavit contains factual allegations entirely outside
the record, including various innuendos and charges concerning the conduct of the trial judge. This material then
was included in the record on appeal, in a manner designed
to exclude both the trial judge and defendant from replying
thereto.
On pages 58, 110 and 117 of his brief, appellant inserts
statements contradicting the fact that Judge Hendricks was
holding court in the Third Judicial District because of the
congested condition of the trial calendar in Salt Lake County.
How and where appellant obtains his intimate knowledge
concerning the internal affairs of the Third Judicial District
Court is not revealed. The facts of record in this case are
certainly entirely to the contrary. The transcript of the
testimony at the hearing, indicates that Judge Hendricks
was sitting in Salt Lake County "upon written invitation"
(R. 40), and at the time of ruling upon the defendant's
Motion to Dismiss, Judge Hendricks stated that he would
"take judicial notice of the crowded condition of the Salt
Lake calendar" adding, "that's why I am here today and
Saturday and another day" (R. 53).
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Again, on pages 58 and 110, the appellant criticizes
what he terms the "summary" action of the trial court in
ruling "without argument or presentation of authority."
But again, the record reveals that both sides were given
full opportunity to present any and all testimony desired
(R. 53). The record further indicates that counsel for the
parties argued the issues to the court, even though the reporter did not transcribe the arguments (R. 53). The trial
court thereafter ruled on the pending motion. Appellant's
real objection, of course, is not based upon either the adequacy or propriety of the hearing before the trial court,
but rather upon the fact that the ruling was contrary to
his position.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE FEDERAL EMPLOYERS' LIABILITY kCT DOES
NOT REQUIRE STATE COURTS TO ENTERTAIN
SUITS ARISING UNDER THE ACT.
The venue provision of the Federal Employers' Liability
Act is contained in Section 6 of the Act. It provides as
follows:
"Under this chapter an action may be brought
in a district court of the United States, in the district
of the residence of the defendant, or in which the
cause of action arose, or in which the defendant shall
be doing business at the time of commencing such action. The jurisdiction of the courts of the United
States under this chapter shall be concurrent with·
that of the courts of the several States." (As amended
June 25, 1948, 45 U. S. C., Sec. 56.)
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It is to be noted that the foregoing section contains
detailed venue provisions with respect to actions brought
in the federal courts. The section contains no such provisions with respect to actions brought in the state courts,
but merely presupposes the existence of jurisdiction in the
courts of the several states. Since the venue privilege prescribed by Section 6 is limited to federal courts, it necessarily follows that the venue of such actions in state courts
is controlled by local state law. Barton v. Delaware, L. &
W. R. Co., 218 App. Div. 748, 218 N. Y. S. 171. For this
reason, cases dealing with the compulsive duty of federal
courts to entertain jurisdiction of actions under the Federal
Employers' Liability Act must be distinguished from authorities involving the question whether state courts may for
good reason decline to exercise jurisdiction of such actions.

The importance of this distinction is recognized in an
annotation in 158 A. L. R. 1022, 1025, 1033, which points
out that cases holding state courts have the power to decline jurisdiction of an action under the Federal Employers'
Liability Act are not authoritative upon the same question
with respect to federal courts, and vice versa. To the same
effect is Southern Ry. Co. v. Cochran, 56 F. (2d) 1019,
1020 (C. C. A. 6) holding that although a federal court
could not refuse to exercise jurisdiction of a case arising
under the Act, a contrary rule exists with respect to such
an action in a state court, the opinion stating: "Authorities
holding that state courts may by reason of local law under
like circumstances in their discretion refuse to entertain a
suit under the Act are not controlling, for the statute does
not impose a duty upon state courts as against a valid excuse,
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but rather confers a power.'' The principle also was affirmed by Mr. Justice Holmes in Douglas v. New York, N.
H. & H. R. Co., 279 U.S. 377, 387, 388, 49 S. Ct. 355, 356,
in the following language:
"As to the grant of jurisdiction in the Employers' Liability Act that statute does not purport to require State Courts to entertain suits arising under
it but only to empower them to do so, so far as the
authority of the United States is concerned ... there
is nothing in the Act of Congress that purports to
force a duty upon such Courts as against an otherwise valid excuse."
The above quotation was reiterated with approval by
the United State Supreme Court in the recent case of Herb
v. Pitcairn, 324 U. S. 117, 120, 65 S. Ct. 459, 461.
It is now a well settled proposition that Section 6 of
the Federal Employers' Liability Act, as amended, was not
intended to, and does not, impose a duty upon a state court
to exercise jurisdiction under the act, merely because a
state court has properly acquired jurisdiction of the person
of the defendant :

Murnan v. Wabash Ry. Co.; 246 N. Y. 244, 158
N. E. 508, 54 A. L. R. 1522, (reversing 220
App. Div. 218, 221 N. Y. S. 332).
Douglas v. New York, N. H. & H. R. Co., 279 U.
S. 377, 49 S. Ct. 355.
Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U. S. 117, 65 S. Ct. 459.
Ex Parte Crandall, 53 F. (2d) 969, affirming
52 F. (2d) 650, cert. denied 285 U. S. 540,
52 S. Ct. 312.
Loftus v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 107 Ohio St. 32·5,
140 N. E. 94, writ of error dismissed, 266
U. S. 639, 45 S. Ct. 97.
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Walton v. Pryor, 276 Ill. 563, 115 N. E. 2, writ
of error dismissed, 245 U. S. 675, 38 S. Ct.
10.
Note (1945) 158 A. L. R. 1022.
44 Harvard Law Review, 41.
39 Yale Law Journal, 388, 391.
56 Yale Law Journal, 1234.
29 Journal of the Am. Jud. Soc., 135, 146.
In Murnan v. Wabash Ry. Co., supra, an action was
brought under the Federal Employers' Liability Act in a
state court of New York by a resident of Connecticut against
an Indiana railroad corporation for alleged injuries
sustained in Michigan. Even though a state statute conferred discretion upon the state court to refuse to entertain
jurisdiction over a cause of action arising out of a tort committed in a sister state where both parties were nonresidents, the Appellate Division of the State Supreme
Court interpreted the Second Employers' Liability Cases
(Mondou v. New York, N. H. & H. R. Co.), 223 U. S. 1,
32 S. Ct. 169, as requiring a holding that the Federal Employers' Liability Act made it mandatory upon the state
courts of New York to exercise jurisdiction in any case
brought under the Act. But upon appeal of the case, the
New York Court of Appeals, speaking through Justice
Pound with the concurrence of a unanimous court including Chief Justice Cardozo, took exactly the opposite view.
The court said :
"That Congress has undertaken to regulate the exercise of jurisdiction by our courts by making compulsory what in other similar cases is discretionary
seems an unreasonable conclusion and a resulting invasion of the powers of our tribunals as heretofore
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exercised. We conclude that a litigant who brings
his action under the federal Employers' Liability Act
stands before the court in no different attitude than
a litigant who brings his action under the statute of
a sister state. He may not be cast out because he is
suing under the act of Congress. He may not enforce
his rights merely because he is suing under the act."
Justice Pound further pointed out that the M ondou
case was authority for the bare proposition that state

courts may not refuse to exercise jurisdiction merely because the right of action arose under a federal statute. It
was emphasized, however, that in all cases state courts
should act in conformity with their own general principles
of practice and procedure.
The decision in the Murnan case was challenged in
Douglas v. New York, N. H. & H. R. Co., supra, upon the
grounds that the discretionary power asserted by the New
York courts under state law, violated the privileges and
immunities clause of the Federal Constitution and also was
repugnant to the jurisdictional provisions of the Federal
Employers' Liability Act. The United States Supreme
Court through Mr. Justice Holmes rejected both of these
arguments, stating :
"Construed as it has been and we believe will
be construed the statute applies to citizens of New
York as well as to others and puts them on the same
footing. There is no discrimination between citizens
as such, and none between nonresidents with regard
to these foreign causes of action. A distinction of
privileges according to residence may be based upon
rational considerations and has been upheld by this
Court, emphasizing the difference between citizenSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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ship and residence. * * * There are manifest
reasons for preferring residents in access to often
overcrowded Courts, both in convenience and in the
fact that broadly speaking it is they who pay for
maintaining the Courts concerned.
"As to the grant of jurisdiction in the Employers' Liability Act that statute does not purport torequire State Courts to entertain suits arising under
it but only to empower them to do so, so far as the
authority of the United States is concerned. It may
very well be that if the Supreme Court of New York
were given no discretion, being otherwise competent,
it would be subject to a duty. But there is nothing
in the Act of Congress that purports to force a duty
upon such Courts as against an otherwise valid excuse."
The proposition that the Federal Employers' Liability
Act presents no obstacle so far as state courts are concerned, to proceed in accordance with their own modes of
procedure and practice, recently was reaffirmed by the
United States Supreme Court in Herb v. Pitcairn, supra.
That case involved two separate actions under the Federal
Employers' Liability Act initially filed in one of the city
courts of Illinois. Judgments for the plaintiffs were obtained but in both cases the verdicts were later set aside.
Before retrial of the cases, the Illinois Supreme Court
handed down a decision holding that city courts of the state
were without jurisdiction in any case where the cause of
action arose outside of the city where the court was located.
Both of the pending cases fell within this prohibition. Thereafter, the plaintiffs moved for a change of venue to the
Circuit Court of the State. The city court granted the
motions and transferred the cases. Defendants then ap-
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peared in the Circuit Court and moved for dismissal ·on
the grounds that the proceedings in the city court were
void, that the city court had no power to transfer venue of
the cases, and that since no action had been commenced in
a court of competent jurisdiction, the statute of limitations
of the Federal Act had run against the actions. The Circuit
Court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss in both
cases. The Supreme Court of Illinois affirmed and the cases
then were appealed to the United States Supreme Court.
There, -the plaintiffs below claimed that the state law as interpreted by the Illinois Supreme Court was discriminatory
and unlawfully interfered with rights conferred by the Federal Employers' Liability Act. In rejecting these contentions, Mr. Justice Jackson, speaking for the majority of the
Court, said :
"Whether any case is pending in the Illinois
courts is a question to be determined by Illinois law,
as interpreted by the Illinois Supreme Court. For as
we have said of the Federal Employers' Liability Act,
'we deem it well to observe that there is not here involved any attempt by Congress to enlarge or regulate the jurisdiction of state courts, or to control or
affect their modes of procedure, but only a question
of the duty of such a court, when its ordinary jurisdiction, as prescribed by local laws, is appropriate to
the occasion, and is invoked in conformity with those
laws, to take cognizance of an action to enforce a
right of civil recovery arising under the Act of Congress, and susceptible of adjudication according to
the prevailing rules of procedure.' Mondou v. New
York, N.H. & H. R. Co., 223. U.S. 1, 56, 57, 32 S. Ct.
169, 178, 56, L. Ed. 327, 38 L. R. A., N. S., 44. 'As to
tl~e grant of jurisdiction in the Employers' Liability
Act, that statute does not purport to require State
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Courts to entertain suits arising under it but only to
empower them to do so, so far as the authority of the
United States is concerned ... But there is nothing
in the Act of Congress that purports to force a duty
upon such Courts as against an otherwise valid excuse.'

*

*

*

*

*

*

" ... It would not be open for us to say that the
state in setting up a local court could not limit its
jurisdiction to actions arising within the city for
which it is established.
" ... We think that the Supreme Court [of Illinois] probably has decided that as a matter of Illinois
law no action is pending against these defendants in
any court and that all of the proceedings have been
of no effect whatever.
"The freedom of the state courts so to decide is,
of course, subject to the qualification that the cause
of action must not be discriminated against because
it is a federal one. McKnett v. St. Louis & S. F. R.
Co., 292 U.S. 230, 54 S. Ct. 690, 78 L. Ed. 1227. But
we cannot say that the court below, in so far as it did
hold the city courts without power, construed the
state jurisdiction and venue laws in a discriminatory
fashion."
The rule of the Douglas case, the Herb case and of the
other authorities above cited is in no way inconsistent with
the true import of Baltimore & 0. R. Co. v. Kepner, 314 U. S.
44, 62 S. Ct. 6, and Miles v. Illinois Central Railroad Company, 315 U. S. 698, 62 S. Ct. 827. In the Kepner case, it
was held that a state court of Ohio had no power to enjoin
the prosecution of an action under the Federal Employers'
Liability Act in the federal district court for the eastern
district of New York. The decision rests upon the venue
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privilege with respect to actions brought in federal courts
created by Section 6 of the Federal Employers' Liability
Act. As heretofore pointed out, that section confers special
privileges upon plaintiffs so far as actions in the federal
courts are concerned, but leaves venue problems in state
courts under the control of the local law, either statutory or judge-made. The opinion in the Kepner case
in no way involved the discretionary power of a state court
to dismiss an F. E. L.A. action upon the grounds of forum
non conveniens. Moreover, since enactment of 28 U. S. C.
Sec. 1404 (a) and the decision of the United States Supreme
Court in Ex Parte Collett,.,__ U. S. - , 69 S. Ct. 944, the
holding of the Kepner case has been vitiated with respect
to its application to an action brought in a federal court
under the Federal Employers' Liability Act.
In Miles v. Illinois Central R. Co., supra, the United
States Supreme Court reversed the judgment of a Tennessee
state court enjoining a resident widow from prosecuting an
action for her husband's death in a Missouri state court.
The basis of the decision was that even though a state may
by reason of its control over its own courts refuse to open
them to an action under the Federal Employers' Liability
Act, it does not follow that still another state (Tennessee)
has the power to close by injunction the courts of the former
state (Missouri) to a plaintiff with a cause of action arising under a federal statute. The Supreme Court expressly
held that it was not dealing "with the power of Missouri
by judicial decision or legislative enactment to regulate the
~f.
~. use of its courts generally as was approved in the Douglas
~
or the Chambers cases." In the course of Mr. Justice Reed's
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majority opinion (concurred in by only two other justices)
the statement was made that "the Missouri Court here involved must permit this litigation," since "to deny citizens
from other states, suitors under the F. E. L. A. access to its
courts would, if it permitted access to its own citizens,
violate the Privileges and Immunities Clause." But it is
manifest that Mr. Justice Reed did not intend by this statement to announce that a state court could not decline jurisdiction of a transitory cause of action under the Federal
Employers' Liability Act, when empowered by local law
as expressed by judicial decision or legislative enactment.
This is made clear by footnote 6 to the opinion, which states:

"Chambers v. Baltimore & 0. R. Co., (1907)
20'7 U. S. 142, 52. L. Ed. 143, 28 S. Ct. 34, or Douglas
v. New York, N. H. & H. R. Co., (1929) 279 U. S.
377, 13 L. Ed. 74 7, 49 8. Ct. 355, do not impinge upon
this principle. In the former case, an Ohio statute
forbade suits in its courts for wrongful death occurring in another state unless the decedent was a citizen of Ohio. This court saw no discrimination against
personal representatives of any decedent since their
right to sue did not depend upon their citizenship but
upon the citizenship of their decedent. In the latter
case a statute of New York, which gave only discretionary jurisdiction to suits by nonresidents but compulsory jurisdiction to suits by residents was held
valid because it treated citizens and noncitizens alike
and tested their right to maintain an action by their
residence or nonresidence."
Furthermore, a majority of the justices (Mr. Justice
Jackson in a concurring. opinion and Mr. Justice Frankfurter '
in a dissenting opinion joined in by the Chief Justice and by
Justices Roberts and Byrnes), specifically disagreed with

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

·r'

;..-

27
the statement in Mr. Justice Reed's opinion that "the
Missouri Court here involved must permit this litigation."
Mr. Justice Jackson said: "I do not, however, agree with
the statement in Mr. Justice Reed's opinion that the
'Missouri Court here involved must permit this litigation.'
It is very doubtful if any requirement can be spelled out of
the Federal Constitution that a state must furnish a forum
for a nonresident plaintiff and a foreign corporation to
fight out issues imported from another state where the cause
of action arose." The concurring opinion also criticized
the system whereby a plaintiff is allowed to go "shopping for
a forum," adding that the judiciary has never favored the
practice of seeking out "soft spots" in the judicial system
in which to bring particular kinds of litigation. Mr. Justice
Frankfurter went even further, saying: "Moreover, the
Constitution would not prevent Missouri from declining to
entertain a suit to vindicate a Federal right, such as was
brought here, if an action to enforce a similar non-Federal
right would also not lie in her courts. The availability of
state courts for the enforcement of Federal rights has not
resulted in putting Federal rights on any different footing
from state rights. 'A state may not discriminate against
rights arising under Federal law,' McKnett v. St. Louis &
S. F. R. Co., (1934) 292 U. S. 234, 78 Led 1229, 54 S. Ct.
690, but neither the Constitution nor Congress has compelled the states to discriminate in favor of Federal rights.
And this court has expressly held that the rights created
by the Federal Employers' Liability Act are not different
in this respect, from other Federal rights."
Much of appellant's brief is devoted to an argument
that for a state court to decline jurisdiction of an F. E. L.A.
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action would violate the privileges and immunities provision
of the Federal Constitution. It is respectfully submitted that
this argument definitely was laid at rest by the decision
of the United States Supreme Court in Douglas v. New
York, N. H. & H. R. Co., supra, and the subsequent cases
herein cited. The various cases referred to in appellant's
brief are fully reconcilable with respondents' position that
state courts are not required to entertain such suits "as
against an otherwise valid excuse." For example, the appellant places great reliance upon the Second Employers'
Liability Cases (M ondou v. New York, N. H. & H. R. Co.)
223 U. S. 1, 32 S. Ct. 169, but the doctrine of that case was
fully reviewed and interpreted in Murnan v. Wabash R. Co.,
supra, and the interpretation there made was expressly approved by the United States Supreme Court in the Douglas
case. The M ondou case, of course, antedates the Douglas case
by some 18 years. McKnett v. St. Louis & S. F. Ry. Co.,
292 U. S. 230, 54 S. Ct. 690, as heretofore pointed out, was
a case in which an Alabama state court refused jurisdiction
of an F. E. L. A. case solely upon the ground that suit was
brought under the federal law. It was held that a state
could not thus discriminate against a right arising under the
federal law, but the opinion also makes clear that Congress
has not attempted to compel states to provide courts for the
enforceme'iit of suits under the Federal Employers' Liability Act. Hoffman v. State of Missouri ex. rel. Foraker,
274 U. S. 21, 47 S. Ct. 485, involved an F. E. L. A. suit
brought in the state of incorporation of the defendant and
where it also was doing business. Under these circumstances, it was held that the suit could not be dismissed on

··;(O

;j(i]

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

0i1.

··

29
the grounds it constituted a burden on interstate commerce.
The doctrine of forum non conveniens and its application
to a suit between non-residents of the forum was in no way
involved. Denver & R. G. W. R. Co. v. Terte, 248 U. S.
284, 52 S. -ct. 152, is a similar type of case in which the
railroad company was sued in the state courts of Missouri.
The Court held that under the facts shown the railroad
company was not doing sufficient business in that state to
make it amenable to process there, and that to allow suit
to proceed would constitute a burden on interstate commerce. The case involved none of the questions presented
in the instant case. Gulf Oil Corporation v. Gilbert, 330
U. S. 501, 67 S. Ct. 839, is hereinafter cited by respondent
in support of its position that a court has the inherent'
power to dismiss an action on the basis of forum non conveniens. It is true that in the course of the opinion Mr.
Justice Jackson made the gratuitous remark based on the
Kepner and Miles decisions "that in cases under the Federal
Employers' Liability Act, we have held a plaintiff's choice
of a forum can not be denied on the basis of forum non
conveniens." This dictum clearly is confined, however, to
the special privilege of bringing F. E. L. A. actions in the
federal courts. It is obvious from both the majority and
concurring opinion in the Miles case that the quoted statement has no application to the discretionary power of a
state court to decline jurisdiction for reasons of forum non
conveniens. Akerly v. New York Central R. R. Co., 168 F.
(2d) 812, and Peterson v. Ogden Union Railway and Depot
Co., 110 Utah 514, 175 P. (2d) 744, are beside the point, in
that they involve the validity of contracts attempting to ex-
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empt the railroad companies from liability to suit in certain
courts. In both cases the contracts were held invalid under
the prohibition imposed against such type contracts by Section 5 of the Federal Employers' Liability Act. In considering the effect of those cases, the distinction heretofore
pointed out should be kept in mind, namely, that the venue
privilege created by Section 6 of the Act is limited by its
terms to federal courts, whereas the venue in state courts
is controlled by local law. See 158 A. L. R. 1033. In Schendel
v. McGee, 300 F. 273 (C. C. A. 8) and Sacco v. Baltimore
& 0. R. Co., 56· F. Supp. 959, it was held that a federal district court could not decline jurisdiction of an F. E. L. A.
suit upon the grounds of a burden on interstate commerce.
The right of a state court to decline jurisdiction upon the
ground of forum non conveniens was not involved. Kilpatrick v. Texas & P. Ry. Co., 166 F. (2d) 788 (C. C. A. 2)
stands for nothing more than that the continuous solicitation of business in New York constitutes sufficient "doing
business" so as to subject a railroad company to service
of process in that state, and that with respect to the
issue of validity of process forum non conveniens is irrelevant. Leet v. Union Pac. R. Co.,· 25 Cal. (2d) 605,
155 P. (2d) 42, 158 A. L. R. 1008, is apparent authority
for appellant's position that a state court will not dismiss
an F. E. L. A. action on the basis of forum non conveniens.
The decision is bottomed, however, upon an erroneous interpretation of the opinions of the United States Supreme
Court in the Kepner and Miles cases. As stated by the annotation in 158 A. L. R. 1033, "neither" of these two cases
"supports the conclusion of the California court."
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II.

THE STATE <COURTS OF UTAH POSSESS THE INHERENT POWER TO DISMISS AN ACTION UPON
THE BASIS OF FORUM NON CONVENIENS.

~~

·. .:.·

In state courts, generally, there exists the power to decline jurisdiction of a cause of action on the basis of forum
non conveniens. The doctrine had its inception in the early
common law courts of Great Britain. Since early times both
the English and Scottish courts freely have recognized and
entertained a plea of forum non conveniens. See: Foster,
"Place of Trial - Interstate Application of Intrastate
Methods of Adjustment" 44 Harvard Law Review, 41, 44,
(which traces the development of the doctrine of forum
non conveniens from the English common law to the state
courts of this country) ; also Logan v. Bank of Scotland),
1 K. B. 141; Longsworth v. Hope, 3 Macph. 1049·, 3 Sc.
Sess. 3rd Series, 1049, 37 Scot. Juris. 552. In the latter
case, Lord Deas, after holding that the court had jurisdiction of the case before him, then stated :
"The only debatable point is whether, as a matter of expediency, this is the court in which the action (for a libel printed in defendant's, London Newspaper, all the parties to which were domiciliary residents of England, plaintiff, however, residing temporarily in Scotland) ought to be tried. It is a valuable discretion, which is vested in every court, not
to exercise its jurisdiction if there are grounds for
holding that, by the exercise of that jurisdiction, the
defendant, who objects to it, will be put to an unfair
disadvantage which he would not be subjected to in
another accessible and competent court."
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In Gulf Oil Corporation v. Gilbert, 330 U. S. 501, 67
S. Ct. 839, it was pointed out that though federal courts
possessed the "inherent power" to dismiss an action on
the basis of forum non conveniens, the doctrine actually
had its origin in the state courts. In the cited case, the
plaintiff below was a resident of Virginia where he operated
a large public warehouse. The defendant was a Pennsylvania
corporation, qualified to do business in both Virginia and
New York, with a process agent in both states. Plaintiff
brought a tort action in the federal court for the southern
district of New York, alleging damages from a fire which
burned his warehouse in Virginia. When sued in New
York, the defendant filed a motion to dismiss upon the
grounds of forum non conveniens, claiming that the appropriate place for trial was in Virginia, where the plaintiff resided and did ~usiness, where all the events in the
litigation took place, where most of the witnesses lived, and
where both state and federal courts were available. The
Supreme Court affirmed the ruling of the lower district
court in granting the motion to dismiss, holding that the
court possessed the inherent power to thus dismiss. In the
course of its opinion, the Supreme Court stated:
"We later expressly said that a state court 'may
in appropriate cases apply the doctrine of forum non
conveniens.' Broderick v. Rosner, 2,94 U. S. 629, 643,
55 S. Ct. 589, 592, 79 L. Ed. 1100, 100 A. L. R. 1133;
Williams v. State of North Carolina, 317 U. S. 287,
294, n. 5, 63 S. Ct. 207, 87 L. Ed. 279, 143 A. L. R.
1273. Even where federal rights binding on state
courts under the Constitution are sought to be adjudged, this Court has sustained state courts in a
refusal to entertain a litigation between a nonresi-
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dent and a foreign corporation or between two foreign
corporations. Douglas v. New York N. H. & H. R.
Co., 279 U. S. 377, 49 S. Ct. 355, 73 L. Ed. 747 ; AngloAmerican Provision Co. v. Davis Provision Co. No.
1, 191 U. S. 373, 24 S. Ct. 92, 48 L. Ed. 225.
" ... The defendant's consent to be sued [in a
foreign jurisdiction] extends only to give the court
jurisdiction of the person; it assumes that the court,
having the parties before it, will apply all the applicable law, including, in those cases where it is
appropriate, its discretionary judgment as to whether
the suit should be entertained. In all cases in which
the doctrine of forum non conveniens comes into
play, it presupposes at least two forums in which
the defendant is amenable to process; the doctrine
furnishes criteria for choice between them."
And in a footnote, to the above statement, the Court
added that "The doctrine [of forum non conveniens] did not
originate in federal but in state courts." See also Koster v.
Lumbermen's 1Vlut. Casualty Co., 330 U. S. 518, 6,7 S. Ct.
828. And to the same effect is St. Louis & Iron Mountain
Ry. v. Taylor, 210 U. S. 281, 285, a case arising under the
provisions of the Federal Safety Appliance Act, in which
the Court said :
" ... Each state may, subject to the restrictions
of the Federal Constitution, determine the limits of
the jurisdiction of its courts, the character of the
contro~ersies which shall be heard in them, and specifically how far it will, having jurisdiction of the
parties, entertain in its courts transitory actions
where the cause of action has arisen outside its borders."
Subsequent to the Gulf Oil Corporation case, Congress
enacted 28 U. S. C. Sec. 1404 (a), specifically authorizing
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federal courts to apply the doctrine of forum non con,.
veniens. But the decision in the Gulf Oil Corporation case
and the other cases herein cited anticipated the federal
statute. Section 1404 (a) is merely declaratory of the
principle of "inherent power" which previously had been
announced by the United States Supreme Court. Interestingly enough, the House Report on the Bill to enact Sec.
1404 (a), cited the holding of the Supreme Court in Baltimore & 0. R. Co. v. Kepner, supra, "as an example of the
need of such a provision." See reviser's notes in House
Report 308, 80th Congress. Since enactment of Section
1404 (a), the Supreme Court has approved application of
the doctrine of forum non conveniens to actions in federal
courts arising under the Federal Employers' Liability Act.
Ex Parte Collett, - U. 8. - , 69 S. Ct. 944.

It is to be noted that the Gulf Oil Corporation case inferentially disposes of another of appellant's arguments,
i. e., that because the respondent, a foreign corporation
doing business in Utah, has appointed a process agent in
Utah, it voluntarily has subjected itself to the jurisdiction
of Utah Courts for the purpose of suit and cannot thereafter invoke the principle of forum non conveniens, citing
Neirbo Co. v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., Ltd., 308 U.
S. 165, 60 S. Ct. 153. But as pointed out by Mr. Justice
Jackson, the defendant in the Gulf Oil Corporation case
likewise was sued as a foreign corporation in a jurisdiction
in which it maintained a process agent. There was no question but that the court where suit was brought had the
jurisdiction to entertain the litigation. However, as stated
by the Supreme Court "that does not settle the question
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whether it [the court where the action was initially brought]
must do so. Indeed the doctrine of forum non conveniens
can never apply if there is absence of jurisdiction or mistake of venue." It is clear, therefore, that the ruling of the
Neirbo Co. case in no way qualifies application of forum
non conveniens, since the doctrine "presupposes at least two
forums in which the defendant is amenable to process" and
"furnishes criteria for choice between them."
Although some states have relied upon specific statutes
as conferring the discretionary power to decline j urisdiction upon the grounds of forum non conveniens (Loftus v.
Penn. R. Co., supra, and Douglas v. New York, N. H. & H.
R. Co., supra,) many state courts have asserted the power
as an inherent common law prerogative. Typical examples
of the exercise of such power on an inherent basis and
without benefit of statute are :

Universal Adjustment Corp. v. Midland Bank,
281 Mass. 303, 184 N. E. 152', 158;
Whitney v. Madden, 400 Ill. 185', 79 N. E. (2d)
593, cert. den. 69 S. Ct. 55 ;
Thistle v. Halstead, 95 N. H. 87, 58 A. (2d) 503;
Sielcken v. Sorenson, 111 N. J. E. 44, 161 A. 47.
See also : Blair, "The Doctrine of Forum Non
Conveniens in Anglo-American Law" 29
Col. L. Rev. 1.
In Universal £4djustment Corp. v. Midland Bank, supra,
Chief Justice Rugg stated the doctrine in that state to be
as follows:
"The governing principle in such circumstances
is that the parties have standing in the courts of this
Commonwealth, not as a matter of strict right but
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only as a matter of comity. Where it appears that complete justice cannot be done here, that the defendant
will be subjected to great and unnecessary inconvenience and expense, and that the trial will be attended,
if conducted here, with many if not insuperable difficulties whi~h all would be avoided without special
hardship to the plaintiff if proceedings are brought
in the jurisdiction where the defendant is domiciled,
where service can be had, where the cause of action
arose and where justice can be done, our courts decline to take jurisdiction on the general ground that
the litigation may more appropriately be conducted
in a foreign tribunal. Stated succinctly, the principle
is that where in a broad sense the ends of justice
strongly indicate that the controversy may be more
suitably tried elsewhere, then jurisdiction should be
declined and the parties relegated to relief to be
sought in another forum. This is the doctrine of our
own decisions. It prevails generally." [Italics added.]
Likewise, in Whitney v. Madden, supra, the Illinois
Supreme Court stated its rule of decision as follows:
" . . . the privilege of free access to the courts
must be tempered with reasonable limitations ...
"Many jurisdictions have added the limitation
that if it is apparent that an appropriate forum is
available and the relief is sought in the local courts
by a nonresident against a nonresident for a transaction which occurred outside the territorial boundaries
of the State, for the purpose of frustrating the defendant, or if the bringing of the action unduly burdens the defendant or causes him great and unnecessary inconvenience, or unnecessarily burdens the
court, the trial court may, in its discretion, decline
the jurisdiction of the case, even though it may have
proper jurisdiction over all parties and the subject
matter involved. This is the doctrine of forum non
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conveniens. The Federal courts have recognized the
application of this doctrine and have found it not
repugnant to section 2 of article IV, and section 1 of
the fourteenth amendment of the constitution of the
United States."
In at least two recent cases, a state court on the basis
of its inherent common law power has applied the doctrine
of forum non conveniens in dismissing actions brought under
the Federal Employers' Liability Act. These are:

Hart v. Southern Pacific Company, (Superior
Ct. of Cook County, Ill. No. 47 S. 96· 23,the opinion is set forth in the Appendix to
this brief and a certified copy thereof has
been filed with the Clerk of the Court.)
Kelly v. Trustee, 1.11Jissouri Pacific Company, et
al., (10 cases-Circuit Court, St. Clair
County, IlL-the written order is set forth
in the Appendix to this brief and a certified
copy thereof has been filed with the Clerk
of the Court.) ·
The opinion in Hart v. Southern Pacific Company,
supra, contains a well reasoned discussion of the applicable
cases, including the Douglas, Kepner, Miles and Gulf Oil
cases. It fully sustains the respondent's position in the present case.

The cited state decisions all focus upon the point that
in applying their inherent discretionary power to dismiss
:, actions brought in an inconvenient forum, state courts
r; should refuse to entertain jurisdiction when undue hardship will be imposed upon one of the parties to the suit,
and when it affirmatively appears that the convenience of
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all concerned will be better served by trial in the forum
where the alleged grievence occurred and most of the witnesses reside. The principle becomes especially appropriate
in suits between non-residents where a "shopping plaintiff"
comes looking for the most suitable bargain counter. The
manifest injustice of suits by plaintiffs looking for "soft
spots" in the judicial system, and the unfair burden such
suits impose upon defendants who are required to transport
witnesses from other states to answer complaints brought in
distant forums, to the detriment of the taxpayers and overcrowded courts of the place chosen for such litigation, has
been the subject of considerable comment by reviewers and
students of our judicial system. The cited article in 44 Harvard Law Review 41 is an interesting example. The article
contains the following pertinent comment with respect to the
impact of the opinion of the United States Supreme Court
in the Douglas case and its application to the decision in
Boright v. Chicago, R. I. & Pac. R. R., 230 N. W. 457, a
case cited as authority by the appellant:
"The most interesting question suggested by the
Douglas case is what will happen in the states which
have thus far felt a constitutional compulsion to entertain vexatious suits by plaintiffs who are citizens
of other states. Will they now feel free to treat questions as to the state of trial as sensibly as they do
questions as to the county of trial, and will they regard citizens of sister states as no more entitled to
abuse their processes than aliens and foreign corporations? This question was raised recently in Minnesota in the case of Boright v. Chicago, R. I. & Pac.
R. R. The case was recognized as of great importance.
Numerous counsel filed briefs as amici curiae-representatives of railroads and, on the plaintiff's side,
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counsel for labor unions and counsel whose interest
is not stated of record. These last, one may infer,
were interested as frequently appearing for non-resident plaintiffs in personal injury cases. The victory
was for the personal injury racket-not, however,
without a vigorous dissent. Thriving under a highly
organized and thus far judicially tolerated system of
ambulance chasing, and the old beliefs as to the effect
of the privileges and immunities clause, the spectacle
of vexatiously imported litigation has long been familiar in Minnesota. The majority opinion in the
Boright case suggests that judges are perhaps becoming callous to it. It seemed that the common law
power to adapt procedure to prevent its abuse had
atrophied. from disuse, and the court found on non- ,
constitutional grounds that it was powerless to dismiss such suits. Instead of regretting this situation,
it glorified the Minnesota law for its hospitality to
strangers, thus indicating that it was still thinking
in terms of a philosophy which assimilates a wouldbe litigant to a laborer or business man entitled to
a free opportunity to try his luck in whatever state
he chooses. Compelled by the United States Supreme
Court to abandon any constitutional sanction for this
theory, the majority of the Court still stubbornly adheres to it as determining at least the domestic policy of the state. The decision is hardly one to commend itself for general acceptance."
So far as the state courts of Utah are concerned, they
are in the same position as the courts of Massachusetts and
Illinois, in that no state statute expressly confers the power
to decline jurisdiction of an action on the basis of the doctrine of forum non conveniens. But this, of course, is immaterial if the discretionary authority is vested in the state
courts as part of their inherent power under common law
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precedent. In his article in 44 Harvard Law Review 41, 52,
Foster points out that it is far more desirable for state
courts to assert their inherent common law powers in this
respect than to wait for possibly unwieldy legislation on the
subject. The article continues:
"The best hope is that courts will feel free to
take appropriate action without specific legislation
authorizing them to do so. It is submitted that authority for such action is implicit in well-established
common law principles. The closest analogy is to
change of venue on terms for the convenience of witnesses . . ."
Again, in 29, Columbia Law Review 1, Mr. Paxton Blair
stated the common law power of state courts in this respect,
as follows:
"At the outset it is to be noted that new legislation is not needed before any benefit can be expected to flow from the remedies we propose ; for the
doctrine in question [forum non conveniens] involves
nothing more than an appeal to the inherent power
possessed by any court of justice-powers, that is to
say, which are incontestibly necessary to the effective performance of judicial functions."
Though no Utah statute in specific terms confers the
power to dismiss an action upon the basis of forum non
conveniens, the State Code (88-2-1) does contain the following reference to the inherent common law powers of the
state courts :
"The common law of England so far as it is not
repugnant to, or in conflict with, the constitution or
laws of the United States, or the constitution or the
I
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laws of this state, and so far only as it is consistent
with and adapted to the natural and physical conditions of this state and the necessities of the people
thereof, is hereby adopted, and shall be the rule of
decision in all courts of this state."
As heretofore pointed out, the doctrine of forum non
conveniens was and is a firmly established principle of the

common law of England. By virtue of the foregoing statute,
this common law principle is incorporated in and made a part
of the local law of this state. As heirs of the English com.,.
mon law, the state courts of Utah not only have the inherent
power to invoke the principle, but also the general statutory
authorization. This necessarily follows, unless it can be
said that the principle of forum non conveniens is repugnant to the state laws or inconsistent with the natural and
physical conditions of the state. But far from being repugnant to or inconsistent with state law, the principle is practically identical with the announced statutory policy of the
Utah courts to order a change of venue within the state
"when the convenience of witnesses and the ends of justice
would be promoted by the change." Utah Code Anno. (1943),
104-4-9 (3). Certainly, there is nothing in the State Constitution or statutes of Utah, which in a way impinges upon
this common law principle. Provisions to the effect that
state "courts shall be open" and that transitory actions
. · "shall be brought and tried" in certain counti~s, contain no
suggestion that a state court may not in an appropriate
case decline to exercise jurisdiction in order to facilitate
justice and prevent undue hardship. Moreover, the state
;.: courts of Utah have original and plenary authority, Art.
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VIII, Sec. 7, Constitution of Utah, and by statute are given
broad discretion to adopt appropriate procedures to carry
their power into effect. Utah Code Anno. (1943), 20-7-3 (8),
(9). The doctrine of forum non conveniens "assumes that
the court, having the parties before it, will apply all the
applicable law, including in those cases where it is appropriate its discretionary judgment as to whether the suit should
be entertained." 330 U. S. 506, 67 S. Ct. 842.
This Court has recognized by its prior ruling that the
state courts of Utah do possess the inherent power to dismiss an action upon the basis of forum non conveniens.
Essentially the same propositions involved in the present
case were argued at some length to the Court on petitions
for alternative writ of prohibition in cases No. 7326, No.
732~7, and No. 7328 entitled The Denver and Rio Grande
Western Railroad Company, a corporation, Plaintiff, v.
The Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County,
State of Utah, and Joseph G. Jeppson, one of the Judges
thereof, Defendants. In the cited cases, this Court by written
order denied alternative writs of prohibition for the stated
reason that it was "not made to appear that there was a
clear duty on the part of the District Court to grant the
motion to dismiss." The order further stated that "denial
of this writ is not intended to suggest what the court might
hold in a proceeding seeking to set aside or review an order
of the District Court dismissing a cause of action for reasons
of forum non conveniens." It is apparent from the terms of
the foregoing order that although the Court recognized the
existence of the inherent power of dismissal in the trial
court, it declined to interfere with the exercise of that
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power upon the plea that there had been an arbitrary abuse
of discretion on the facts of the particular case. But in order
to reach the issue of discretion, the Court necessarily held
that the trial court had the inherent power in a proper case
to dismiss for reasons of forum non conveniens.
It is respectfully submitted, therefore, that the doctrine
of forum non conveniens is a part of the law of this state,
both on the basis of inheritance from the English common
law and on the basis of the previous ruling of this Court.
It is as much a part of the law of this state as any state
statute. It is a necessary part of the inherent right and
power of the state courts in order to control their own procedure, effect the orderly administration of their affairs,
and "promote the ends of justice."

III.
THE TRIAL COURT EXERCISED A PROPER DISCRETION IN DISMISSING, WITHOUT PR.E-JUDICE,
THE PRESENT ACTION.
The various factors to be given consideration by a trial
court in connection with a motion to dismiss on the grounds
of forum non conveniens were stated by Mr. Justice Jackson in Gulf Oil Corporation v. Gilbert, supra, as follows:
"If the combination and weight of factors requisite to given results are difficult to forecast or
state, those to be considered are not difficult to name.
An interest to be considered, and the one likely to be
most pressed, is the private interest of the litigant.
Important considerations are the relative ease of
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access to sources of proof ; availability of compulsory
process for attendance of unwilling, and the cost of
obtaining attendance of willing, witnesses; possibility of view of premises, if view would be appropriate
to the action; and all other practical problems that
make trial of a case easy, expeditious and inexpensive. There may also be questions as to the enforcibility of a judgment if one is obtained. The court will
weigh relative advantages and obstacles to fair trial.
It is often said that the plaintiff may not, by choice
of an inconvenient forum, 'vex,' 'harass,' or 'oppress'
the defendant by inflicting upon him expense or
trouble not necessary to his own right to pursue his
remedy. * * *
"Factors of public interest also have place in
applying the doctrine. Administrative difficulties
follow for courts when litigation is piled up in congested centers instead of being handled at its origin.
Jury duty is a burden that ought not to be imposed
upon the people of a community which has no relation to the litigation. In cases which touch the affairs of many persons, there is reason for holding
the trial in their view and reach rather than in remote parts of the country where they can learn of
it by report only. There is a local interest in having
localized controversies decided at home."
Again in Loftus v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 107 Ohio St.
325, 140 N. E. 94, 99, in discussing the reasons why an
F. E. L. A. action arising in Pennsylvania and brought in
Ohio against a Pennsylvania corporation was dismissed
on the basis of forum non conveniens, the Court said:
" ... It has not been made to appear that this
plaintiff has been denied access to the courts of Pennsylvania, or that in any manner substantial prejudice results to him by the Ohio courts having sus-
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tained the motion to quash. Again it is difficult to
see how he can be prejudiced by being required to
litigate his cause at the place of his residence, or at
the place of his injury, in the State of Pennsylvania,
where no doubt his witnesses reside, and where his
litigation can be prosecuted at much less expense
than in the distant jurisdiction of the State of Ohio.
* * * [It] might very pertinently be remarked
at this point that the courts of our state are maintained at considerable expense, and only a small fraction of such expense is charged to litigants, the major
portion being met by taxes and levied upon the property of the state. The constitutional mandate that
all courts shall be open does not require that the
burdens of taxation in a single state shall be further
increased to provide remedies by judicial process for
those who for reasons of their own prefer to reside
in other states."
The foregoing quotations make clear the criteria for
application of the principle of forum non conveniens. All
of these factors affirmatively were shown to exist in the
case at bar. The alleged cause of action arose in another
state, some distance from the forum. Both parties to the
suit were non-residents, the plaintiff being a resident of
Denver, Colorado, and the defendant being a foreign corporation with its general offices and headquarters located in
Denver, Colorado. As shown at the hearing on the defendant's motion in the court below, all of the witnesses necessary for a fair trial of the case resided within convenient
distance to Denver, Colorado, including the plaintiff,
himself. The relative superiority of Denver as compared to Salt Lake City, with respect to ease of access to
sources of proof can not be questioned. Moreover, it was
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shown that if trial took place in Salt Lake City, the defendant would be seriously handicapped by the lack of compulsory
process to secure the attendance of necessary witnesses,
and that the cost of obtaining the attendance of witnesses
in any event would be excessive and burdensome. Moreover, many factors of public interest in the present case
tended to make trial in Salt Lake City inconvenient and
vexatious. The trial court took notice of the congested
condition of the court calendar in Salt Lake County, and
the delay that this and similar type cases imposed upon
local litigation. Other factors which the trial court weighed
consisted of the burden of jury duty on local citizens in
cases imported from another state, and the expense of
maintaining local courts in order to provide a forum for
foreign controversies. Also, it was made to appear without
contradiction, that trial of the present case in the courts
of Colorado could be had without prejudice to the rights of
the plaintiff and with much greater convenience to all concerned.
In view of all these considerations, the trial court's
exercise of discretionary authority in declining to assume
jurisdiction of this case cannot be seriously questioned. For
the trial court to have acted otherwise would have constituted an abuse of its discretion. The record demonstrates
that the trial court's ruling was based upon considered
judgment and unrefuted facts. The discretion exercised
clearly was dictated by considerations of fair play and evenhanded justice.
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CONCLUSION

It is respectfully submitted that the venue privilege
as contained in Section 6 of the Federal Employers' Liability Act does not require state courts to entertain actions
under the Act. The venue of such actions in state courts
is left to the local state law. For the Act "does not impose
a duty upon state courts as against a valid excuse, but
rather confers a power." Moreover, the decisions of the
United States Supreme Court have established that a state
court may exercise its discretionary authority to dismiss
an action brought by a non-resident against a foreign corporation doing business within the forum, without violating
any provision of the Federal Constitution.
By virtue of its heritage of the principles of the common law of England, the state courts of Utah have the inherent power to dismiss an action upon the basis of forum
non conveniens. The assertion of this discretion by the
state courts is fully sustained by authority and precedent.
It is a necessary power of the state courts in order to control their own procedure and "to promote the ends of justice." In the present action between a non-resident plaintiff and a foreign corporation on a cause of action arising
in another state, there was an affirmative showing in the
trial court of serious inconvenience and hardship to the defendant if trial were permitted in the courts of Salt Lake
County instead of the courts of Colorado, where the plaintiff and all the necessary witnesses resided. It further was
shown that the costs of trial in Salt Lake County would be
vexatious and burdensome to the defendant, and that trial
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of the case in Salt Lake County would add to the congestion
of a badly crowded court calendar. In consideration of all
these factors, the trial court exercised a proper discretion
in dismissing, without prejudice, the plaintiff's complaint,
in order that the action might be initiated in a more convenient forum.

Respectfully submitted,

VAN COTT, BAGLEY,
COR.NWALL & McCARTHY,
CLIFFORD L. ASHTON,

Attorneys for Respondent.
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Thompson, Trustee, etc., No. 13751; Cloyd Pottorff vs.
Thompson, Trustee, Missouri Pacific Railroad Co., No.
12317; Leroy C. Bair vs. Thompson, Trustee, etc., No. 10848;
Harry Carter v. Thompson, Trustee, etc., No. 11003, the
defendant's joint and several motions to dismiss, etc., are
and the same are hereby denied.
(b) That in the cases of Sherman Garrison vs. Thompson, Trustee, etc., No. 14343; Preston Garrison vs. Thompson, Trustee, etc., No. 14342; James A. Jones vs. Thompson, Trustee, etc., No. 13383; Arnie C. Green v. Thompson,
Trustee, etc., No. 13521; defendant is hereby given leave to
withdraw his answer, and the Court, on consideration of his
several motions to dismiss, does order that plaintiffs' several
complaints be, and the same are, hereby dismissed without
prejudice to each plaintiff to reb ring his action elsewhere.
Enter:
/a/ RALPH L. MAXWELL,
Circuit J udg'e.
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STATE OF ILLINOIS }
ss.
COUNTY OF COOK
IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF COOK COUNTY
W. J. HART,
Plaintiff,

vs.

No. 47 S 9623

SOUTHERN PACIFIC COMPANY, a
corporation,
DefendJant.

OPINION OF THE COURT UPON THE MOTION OF
THE DEFENDANT TO DISMISS THE PLAINTIFF'S CAUSE OF ACTION.

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
This action is brought under the Federal Employers
Liability Act to recover damas-es for personal injuries alleged to have been sustained by the plaintiff on July 2,
1946, at Albany, Oregon, while in defendant's employ as
a switchman. The plaintiff resides at Albany, Oregon. The
defendant is incorporated under the laws of Kentucky. It
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operates railroad lines as a common carrier in the states of
Texas, New Mexico, Utah, Arizona, California, Nevada and
Oregon arid not elsewhere. Defendant does not operate any
railroad nor own or maintain any tracks within 1000 miles
of Illinois. It does, however, maintain an office in Chicago
for soliciting freight and passenger business and is, for
purposes of venue, doing business in the State of Illinois.

r,l

The defendant filed a written motion to dismiss the
case under the principle of forum non conveniens. In support of this motion] affidavits were filed by the defendant
alleging substantially the following: That the defendant is
not an Illinois corporation; does not operate a railroad line
into Illinois ; does not own or maintain any tracks within
Illinois ; is not licensed to do business in Illinois; that the
injuries complained of by the plaintiff occurred in Albany,
Oregon, the place of residence of the plaintiff.
The affidavits further set forth that 14 witnesses necessary for the defense of the cause of action reside in Albany,
Oregon, or substantially in that vicinity, a distance from
Chicago by rail of approximately 2300 miles; that two
physicians residing at or near Albany, Oregon, will be required to attend the trial in Chicago; that at least five (5)
days of actual trial will be required to complete the testimony in this case, that all of the defendant's witnesses will
have to be transported to Chicago and housed and fed here at
the defendant's expense; that traveling time for each of the~e
witnesses by rail will require additional three days in each
direction; that the witnesses are employed by the railroad
and that their absence for a period of approximately eleven
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days would impede the railroad service; that the defendant
would be required to pay for the time of these witnesses during their absence; that its expenditure for such purposes
would approximate the sum of Thirty Seven Hundred Dollars ( $3700.00) .
The affidavits further recite that there is functioning
in the State of Oregon regularly constituted state and federal courts available to the plaintiff for the adjudication of
his claim. That a case now filed in the local courts of Oregon
could be reached for trial within five months.
The affidavits further set forth that during the period
from July 2, 1945 to April 12, 1946, a single attorney filed
thirty-four cases under the Federal Employers Liability
Act in the Superior Court of Cook County against the same
defendant, arising out of accidents which occurred in California, Arizona, New Mexico ~nd Oregon. That in the fiveyear period from July 1, 1941 to June 30, 1946, more than
669, of such cases were commenced in the courts of Cook
County, Illinois, and notices of 546 additional claims were
filed under the Federal Employers Liability Act by plaintiffs, none of them residents of Illinois; that one of the attorneys for the plaintiff (now deceased) participated in
114 of these cases; that the aggregate of such cases filed
and claims which might result into actions in this county
imported into Chicago between 1941 and 1946 total 1215,
an average rate of 308 cases and 316 claims per year, and
that the percentage of increase is constantly mounting.
The affidavits further set forth that these transitory
cases clog the jury calendars of our courts and constitute a
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financial burden on this county and state, and that the
jury calendar of common law cases is now three years
behind.
A counter affidavit was filed in behalf of the plaintiff
to the effect that the above case was filed in the Superior
Court of Cook County not for the purpose of harassing the
defendant, but because it was the plaintiff's belief that he
could secure a larger and more substantial verdict against
the defendant in this jurisdiction than in his own immediate locality; that Illinois citizens from time to time filed
cases on transitory torts in other states, and that the application of the doctrine of forum non conveniens would
warrant other courts from excluding cases of Illinois residents.
CONTENTION OF THE PARTIES
There is no doubt that this court has jurisdiction of the
subject matter and of the parties. It is conceded that generally the principle of forum non conveniens is recognized
in the State of Illinois. The sole issue is whether or not the
Illinois courts may invoke this principle to appropriate cases
brought under the Federal Employers Liability Act. The
principle of forum non conveniens is simply that a court may,
because of considerations of convenience to the parties or
to the court, refuse to hear a case even though it is otherwise properly before the court.
Section 6 of the Federal Employers Liability Act (45
U. S. C. A. Section 56) contains the following relevant
provision:
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"Under this chapter an action may be brought
in a district court of the United States, in the district
of the residence of the defendant, or in which the
cause of action arose, or in which the defendant shall
be doing business at the time of commencing such
action. The jurisdiction of the courts of the United
States under this chapter shall be concurrent with
that of the courts of the several States, and no case
arising under this chapter and brought in any State
court of competent jurisdiction shall be removed to
any court of the United States."
The plaintiff maintains that the above provision which
conferred concurrent jurisdiction upon the State courts
made it mandatory upon a state court to exercise its jurisdiction in all cases brought under this Act. He maintains
that the principle of forum non conveniens is not applicaable to cases under Federal Employers Liability Act and
cites authorities to support this view.
The defendant contends that the grant of jurisdiction
to state courts under the Employers Liability Act only imposes on state courts a duty to act in conformity with local
laws and general principles of practice and procedure prevailing in that court; that Congress did not attempt to compel the exercise of jurisdiction by a state court if such
jurisdiction in other similar cases is discretionary.

CONSIDERATION OF AUTHORITIES
The general principle of forum non conveniens has
been approved by the Supreme Court of Illinois in the most
recent case of Whitney v. Madden, 400 Ill. 185, in which
the court says :
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"* * * if it is apparent that an appropriate
forum is available and the relief is sought in the local
courts by a non-resident against a non-resident for a
transaction which occurred outside the territorial
boundaries of the State, for the purpose of frustrating the defendant, or if the bringing of the action
unduly burdens the defendant or cause him great and
unnecessary inconvenience, or unnecessarily burdens
the court, the trial court may, in its discretion, decline the jurisdiction of the case, even though it may
have proper jurisdiction over all parties and the subject matter involved. This is the doctrine of forum
non conveniens. The Federal courts have recognized
the application of this doctrine and have found it not
repugnant to section 2 of article IV, and section 1
of the fourteenth amendment of the Constitution of
the United States."
Although the above case does not involve an action under
the Federal Employers Liability Act, it does establish the
principle that local courts may refuse to entertain jurisdiction of a case because of inconvenience to the parties or the
court. The Federal courts have also consistently recognized
and applied the principle of forum non conveniens. Kostner
v. Lumbermen's Mutual Co., 330 U.S. 518; Gulf Oil Corpora,.
tion v. Gilbert, 330 U. S. 501.
The sole question presented by the motion to dismiss,
is whether or not the principle of forum non conveniens is
applicable to cases arising under the Federal Employers
Liability Act.
The plaintiff relies principally upon the language of the
following cases of the United States Supreme Court: B. &
0. R. Co. v. Kepner, 314 U. S. 44; Miles v. Illinois Central
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Railroad Co., 315 U. S. 698; Gulf Oil Corporation v. Gilbert,
330 U. S. 501. In each of the above cases the majority
opinion stated categorically that the principle of forum
non conveniens is not applicable to cases arising under the
Federal Employers Liability Act. An analysis of these cases,
however, will demonstrate that these categorical statements
were merely dicta and that the principle of forum non
conveniens was not directly involved.
The Kepner case involved an attempt by a state court
of Ohio to enjoin the prosecution of a case under the Federal Employers Liability Act which had been filed in the
Federal District Court of New York. The United States
Supreme Court was at first evenly divided, but upon rehearing rendered a decision by a divided court to the effect
that a state court could not enjoin its citizens from seeking
access to a foreign forum of their choice. The right of the
federal district court of New York to refuse to take jurisdiction of this case because of inconvenience either to the
parties or to the court was not in issue. Hence, the b:road
statement in the majority opinion that the principle of
forum non conveniens is not applicable to cases under the
Federal Employers Liability Act is mere dictum.
The Miles case involved the power of one state to enjoin
its citizens from seeking access to a forum in another state.
A suit was filed in a Tennessee court for injunction to restrain a Tennessee citizen from prosecuting an action
brought in Missouri under the Federal Employers Liability
Act. The holding of the United States Supreme Court by
a vote of 5 to 4, was that the Tennessee court could not en-
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join its citizens from seeking access to the Missouri court
on the ground of inconvenience to the defendant. The Miles
case did not involve the right of the Missouri court to decline to hear this case because of inconvenience to the parties
or to the court. In fact, the opinion in the Miles case recognized the power of a state to regulate by judicial decision
the use of its courts by applying the principle of forum non
conveniens (315 U. S. 704) :
"This is not to say that states cannot control
their courts. We do not deal here with the power of
Missouri by judicial decision or legislative enactment
to regulate the use of its courts generally, as was approved in the Douglas or the Chambers cases, supra,
note 6. We are considering another state's power to
so control its own citizens that they cannot exercise
the federal privilege of litigating a federal right in
the court of another state."
Obviously the Miles case is no authority for the proposition that the principle of forum non conveniens is not
applicable to cases arising under the Federal Employers
Liability Act.
The Gulf Oil case did not involve an action under the
Federal Employers Liability Act. The issue in that case
was whether or not a United States District Court had the
inherent power to apply the principle of forum non conveniens to dismiss a case based on an ordinary tort brought
in a District Court of New York against a foreign corporation to recover damages sustained in Virginia. In a 5 to 4
decision, Justice Jackson, speaking for the majority of the
court did say gratuitously, "It is true that in cases under
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the Federal Employers Liability Act, we have held a plaintiff's choice of a forum cannot be denied on the basis of
forum non conveniens.'' (Citing the Miles and the Kepner
cases.) The discretionary power of a state court to apply
the principle of forum non conveniens to Federal Employers
Liability Act cases was obviously not involved.
The other cases cited by the plaintiff in his brief are
similarly distinguishable. The only case which appears to
support plaintiff's position is Leet v. Union Pacific, 155
Pac. (2d) 42 (California). In that case the plaintiff, as
administrator appointed by the California court and a resident of California, sued in a California state court for damages arising out of an accident in Oregon. The California
court held that forum non conveniens is not applicable to
cases arising under the Federal Employers Liability Act, citing the Miles and Kepner cases. However, the plaintiff, a
resident of the State of California, was appointed administrator by the Probate ·Court of California and could not sue in
that capacity in any other state. As the court pointed out in
its opinion, it would be anomalous to appoint Leet as administrator for the purpose of suing in California and then deny
him the right to sue by reasons of inconvenience.
On the other hand, many of the decisions cited by
plaintiff contain language to the effect that the jurisdiction
of state courts in cases under the Federal Employers Liability Act are subject to local laws and procedure.
The phrase "as prescribed by local laws is adequate
for the occasion" or "according to the rules of procedure
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prevailing in that court" seems to be a uniform limitation
in the cases cited by the plaintiff.
The United States Supreme Court as well as state
courts have recognized these limitations.
In the Second Employers Liability Cases, 223 U. S. 1,
the court said (page 56-57) :

"* * * we deem it well to observe that there
is not here involved any attempt by Congress toe~
large or regulate the jurisdiction of State courts or to
control or affect their modes of procedure, but only
a question of the duty of such a court, when its ordinary jurisdiction as prescribed by local laws is appropriate to the occasion and is invoked in conformity with those laws, to take cognizance of an action
to enforce a right of civil recovery arising under the
act of Congress and susceptible of adjudication according to the prevailing rules of procedure." (Emphasis mine.)
To the same effect seeM cKnett vs. St. L. & S. F. Ry. Co.,
292 U. S. 230; Minn. & St. L. R. R. vs. Bombolis, 241 U. S.
211, 218.
The case of Douglas v. New York, N. H. & H. R. Co.,
279 U. S. 385, involved a suit in New York under the Federal Employers Liability Act by a resident of Connecticut
for injuries sustained in Connecticut against the defendant
railroad, a Connecticut corporation doing business in New
York. A New York statute limited actions against foreign
corporations by non-residents to foreign corporations doing
business within the State. It was contended that the jurisdiction upon state courts is imposed by the Employers Liabil-
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ity Act. Justice Holmes, speaking for a majority of the
court, said:

"As to the grant of jurisdiction in the Employers' Liability Act, that statute does not purport to
require state courts to entertain suits arising under
it, but only to empower them to do so, so far as the
authority of the United States is concerned. It may
very well be that if the Supreme Court of New York
were given no discretion, being otherwise competent,
it would be subject to a duty. But there is nothing
in the act of Congress that purports to force a duty
upon such courts as against an otherwise valid ex-

cuse."
Murnan v. Wabash Railroad, 246 New York 244, involved an action begun in New York state court by a resident of Connecticut under the Federal Employers Liability
Act for an accident which occurred in Michigan on the defendant's railroad. The trial court dismissed the case under
the principle of forum non conveniens. The New York
Court of Appeals said :
"There is not here involved any attempt by Congress to enlarge or regulate the jurisdiction of State
courts· or to control or affect the modes of procedure,
but only a question of the duty of such a court, when
its ordi'YUlry jurisdiction as prescribed by local laws
is appropriate to the occasion and is invoked in conformity with those laws, to take cognizance of an
action to enforce a right of civil recovery arising
under the act of Congress and susceptible of adjudication according to the prevailing rules of procedure

* * *"
"That Congress has undertaken to regulate the
exercise of jurisdiction by our courts by making compulsory what in similar cases is discretionary seems
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an unreasonable conclusion and a resulting invasion
of the powers of our tribunals as heretofore exercised.
We conclude that a litigant who brings his action
under the Federal Employers' Liability Act stands
before the court in no different attitude than a litigant who brings his action under the statute of a sister state. He may not be cast out because he is suing
under the Act of Congress. He may not enforce his
rights merely because he is suing under the act."
(Emphasis mine.)
The Illinois Supreme Court has ruled that the Federal
Employers Liability Act did not compel state courts to
handle all cases falling under the provisions of that Act.
In Walton v. Pryor, 276 Ill. 563, our own Supreme Court
said:
"In view of the powers of the Federal government and the States and in the light of the uniform
decisions relating to the subject, this provision (Sec.
6 of the Federal Act) can only mean that when the
jurisdiction of the courts of a State as fixed by local
laws empowers them to hear and determine a certain
class of actions, an action of that class arising under
Federal law may be enforced as of right in the S,tate
court." (Emphasis mine.)
In a more recent case under the Federal Employers
Liability Act (Taylor v. Southern Railway Company, 350
Ill. 139) our Supreme Court said :
"If he elects to bring his suit in a State court
the act having made no regulation of the practice
and procedure in those actions, the practice and procedure are regulated by the law of the forum. The
act contemplated suits in State courts and accepted
State procedure in advance. (Minneapolis and St.
I
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local litigants and witnesses are interested. That such a
trial costs the taxpayers of St. Clair County in jury fees,
court's and court attache's time approximately $600.00 to
$900.00.

10. That while Section 6 of the Federal Employers'
Liability Act confers jurisdiction upon this court to try
these cases, it is not mandatory upon the Court to accept that
jurisdiction. That it is within the inherent power of this
Court in its discretion to decline jurisdiction of litigation
between two non-residents when its acceptance will and does
interfere with its own orderly and efficient administration
of justice, unnecessarily burdens the Court, and when such
litigation can be conducted in an available forum in the
State of plaintiff's residence or in a State where the accident
occurred, which is more conveniently located for the parties,
and where the elements of undue cost, vexation, frustration
and harassment to the parties do not exist.
11. That each case here sought to be dismissed, as
well as any other case similarly brought in which a dismissal on similar grounds is prayed, must be considered
on its own particular merits. In several of the cases embraced by this motion, the defendant has taken plaintiff's
deposition, while in others, the .Statute of Limitations has
either run or about to expire. In such cases the allowance
of the motion would materially prejudice the plaintiff's
rights.
IT IS, THERE-FORE, ORDERED:
(a) That in the cases of Alee Richardson vs. Thompson, Trustee, etc., No. 12283; Raymond E. Lipscomb vs.
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cently passed and became effective September 1, 1948. It
provides as follows :
"For the convenience of parties and witnesses,
in the interest of justice, a District Court may transfer any civil action to any other District or Division
where it might have been brought." (Title 28, U.S.
Code, Section 1404(a) .)
The contention of the plaintiff that this statute is not
applicable to cases under Federal Employers Liability Act
does not lend itself to reason in view of the reference of the
statute to "any civil action." This statute is an express
recognition of the principle of forum non conveniens in
the Federal courts. It is difficult to perceive any sound
reason why the Federal courts should enjoy the prerogative
of refusing to hear cases because of inconvenience whpe the
same privilege is denied to state courts. It is true that in
the Federal courts only a transfer to another district is
required while in the state courts a dismissal and the refiling
in another jurisdiction is necessary. Yet, that distinction
is more perfunctory than real. In the light of this new
statute, it would appear that the concurrent jurisdiction of
state courts should also be subject to the privilege of refusing jurisdiction because of inconvenience.
CONCLUSION
The principle of forum non conveniens lies in the sound
discretion of the court. It should be applied with great
caution and reserve. Serious consideration should be given
to the intent of Congress. to provide a forum for cases under
the Federal Employers Liability Act beyond the locale of
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the accident if desired. Persons injured in employment
should have the opportunity of seeking a forum away from
local influences and other disadvantages. Only in extreme
cases of inconvenience should a court refuse to take jurisdiction.
Such an extreme situation is presented by this case.
The unusual factual situation in this case justifies this
court to invoke the principle of forum non conveniens. The
defendant has no railroad line into Illinois, but only maintains an office for solicitation of business. It is neither
incorporated in Illinois nor authorized to do business under
our statutes. The witnesses for both plaintiff and defendant reside at a distance of about 2300 miles from this jurisdiction. Plaintiff lives in Oregon. The accident occurred in
Oregon, in a locale not familiar to our local courts and juries.
Fourteen witnesses, including two physicians, will have to
be transported, housed and fed by the defendants for about
two weeks at an expense of about $3700.00, not recoverable
as costs in the event of a victory by the defe~dant. 'These
witnesses will be separated from their customary jobs and
professions.
This case is not an occasional instance of a migratory
suit coming into our jurisdiction. The affidavits on file in
this cause set forth that cases of this migratory character
now pending in this jurisdiction represent a large percentage of all cases pending in the local courts; that the number
is constantly increasing. The influx of these cases into this
jurisdiction is not a mere accident. It commenced in 1941
when an enterprising group of lawyers saw the possibility
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of personal profits from the importation of these cases to
this jurisdiction. These cases have been clogging our court
calendars and materially interefere and delay the progress
of other cases in our courts. Citizens of Illinois, many of
them working people, who sustained serious injuries are
obliged to wait as much as three and four years to have
their rights adjudicated. The influx of these migratory
cases in such large numbers is a grave injustice to these
people.
This court will take judicial notiee that the trial of each
of these migratory cases involves a cost to our taxpayers
of over $1,000 per case, based on an average of a five-day
jury trial; the salary of a presiding judge for such period
is approximately $350.00; the jury fees approximately
$300.00; and, in addition thereto, the salaries of clerks,
bailiffs, cost of heat, light and other services certainly aggregate an amount in excess of $1,000 per case. Upon that
basis the taxpayers of Illinois will be burdened by an expense of about one and a half million dollars in connection
with these cases, whereas the filing fee is only $23.00 per
case. It does not appear to be reasonable that Congress
intended unqualifiedly to impose such a burden on these
defendants and on state courts.
It is inconceivable that under such extreme circumstances a state court is powerless to protect itself against
the flagrant abuse of comity. This case must be considered
in the light of its own particular circumstance and in light of
the general situation prevailing in this jurisdiction. All
these factors lead me to the conclusion that the principle of
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forum non conveniens should be applied to this case. Ac-

cordingly, on the basis of the principle of forum non conveniens, the motion to dismiss this case will be allowed,
and the cause is hereby dismissed.
(Signed) SAMUEL B. EPSTEIN,
Judge.

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF
ST. CLAIR COUNTY, ILLINOIS
WILLIAM J. KELLY,
Plaintiff,

vs.
GUY A. THOMPSON, TRUSTEE,
MISSOURI PACIFIC RAILROAD
COMPANY, a Corporation,

CIVIL ACTION
AT LAW
NO. 13578

Defendant.

ALEE RICHARDSON,
Plaintiff,

vs.
GUY A. THOMPSON, TRUSTEE,
MISSOURI PACIFIC RAILROAD
COMPANY, a Corporation,

CIVIL ACTION
AT LAW
NO. 1226,3

Deferulmnt.

SHERMAN GARR:ISON,
Plaintiff,

vs.
GUY A. THOMPSON, TRUSTEE,
MISSOURI PACIFIC RAILROAD
COMPANY, a Corporation,

CIVIL ACTION
AT LAW
NO. 14343

Defendant.
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PRES·TON GARRISON,
Plaintiff,

vs.
GUY A. ·THOMPSON, TRUSTEE,
MISSOURI PACIFIC RAILROAD
COMPANY, a Corporation,

CIVIL ACTION
AT LAW
NO. 14342

Defendant.

JAMES A. JONES,
Plaintiff,

vs.
GUY A. THOMPSON, TRUSTEE,
MISSOURI PACIFIC RAILROAD
COMPANY, a Corporation,

CIVIL ACTION
AT LAW
NO. 13383

Defendhnt.

RAYMOND E. LIPSCOMB,
Plaintiff,

vs.
GUY A. THOMPSON, TRUSTEE,
MISSOURI PACIFIC RAILROAD
COMPANY, a Corporation,

CIVIL ACTION
AT LAW
NO. 13751

Defendant.

ARNIE C. GREEN,
Plaintiff,

vs.
GUY A. THOMPSON, TRUSTEE,
MISSOURI PACIFIC RAILROAD
COMPANY, a Corporation,

CIVIL ACTION
AT LAW
NO. 13521

Defendant.

CLOYD POTTORFF,
Plaintiff,

vs.
GUY A. THOMPSON, TRUSTEE,
MISSOURI PACIFIC RAILROAD
COMPANY, a Corporation,

CIVIL ACTION
AT LAW
NO. 12317

Defendant.
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Loois Railroad Co. v. Bombolis, 241 U. S. 211; Louw~
ville and Nashville Railroad Co. v. Stew·art, 241 id.
261.) But the act of Congress does not attempt to enlarge or regulate the jurisdiction of State courts or
to control or affect their modes of procedure, but only
imposes on such a court the duty, when its ordinary
jurisdiction, as prescribed by local laws, is appropri·
ate to the occasion and is invoked in conformity with
those laws, to take cognizance of an action to enforce
a right of civil recovery arising under the act and
susceptible of adjudication according to the prevailing rules of procedure. Minneapolis and St. Louis
Railroad Co. v. Bombolis, supra."
Plaintiff admits that this court would have the right
to deny jurisdiction of this case if the Illinois statute gave
it such right. He distinguishes the case of Walton v. Pryor,
supra, on the ground that an Illinois statute prohibited
actions in this state for wrongful death occurring outside
of the State of Illinois. He also attempts to distinguish
the case of Murnan v. Wabash Railway Company as well as
the Douglas v. N. Y. N. H. & H. R. Co. on the ground of
existing statutes. If the jurisdiction of a state court in
cases arising under the Federal Liability Act can be limited
by statute, there seems to be no logical reason why limitations under common law may not also be enforced. If the
principle of forum non conveniens is an established rule of
administration of justice in a state, it is immaterial whether
it has been established by judicial decision or legislative
enactment.
As further proof that the convenience of the parties
and of the court is gaining favor, a Federal statute was reSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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HARRY L. CARTER,
Plaintiff,

vs.
GUY A. THOMPSON, TRUSTEE,
MISSOURI PACIFIC RAILROAD
COMPANY, a Corporation;

CIVIL ACTION
AT LAW
NO. 11003

Defendant.

LEROY C. BAIRD,
Plaintiff,

vs.
GUY A. THOMPSON, TRUSTEE,
MISSOURI PACIFIC RAILROAD
COMPANY, a Corporation,

CIVIL ACTION
AT LAW
NO. 10848

DefendJant.

ORDER
A joint and several verified motion to dismiss was here
filed by the same defendant to apply in each of the above
styled cases. Leave to withdraw each of the defendants'
answers was sought and alternative relief to dismissal such
as a general continuance or 3: transfer of venue in each case
to adjoining counties of the State where trials could be
had without undue interference with the administration of
justice was also requested in such motion.

The said joint and several motion was argued by counsel for both parties on September 24, 1948, and briefs requested.
(1) However, on the 5th day of October, 1948, because the parties had taken depositions in the case of Kelly
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v. Thompson, etc., No. 13578, and the same had previously
been set for trial, this Court denied the motion as to said
cause, and ordered that it be tried, but in said order did
save and reserve its decision on said motion as to the remaining cases.
(2) Now on this 27th day of January, 1949, all
briefs having been furnished, and the Court, after having
been properly advised in the premises, and after having
made personal investigation and observations as to the condition of the law, chancery and criminal dockets and the
administration of the judicial business of the St. Clair
·County Circuit Court, finds:
'That in each of the cases sought to be dismissed,
the plaintiff brought his suit for damages under the provisions of the Federal Employers' Liability Act for injuries sustained while in the employ of the defendant.
1.

2. That the defendant in each case is Guy A. Thompson, Trustee of the Missouri Pacific Railroad Company, a
citizen and resident of Missouri, and in his capacity as
Trustee operates a railroad in Illinois and Missouri, and
other states in the South and Southwest.
3. That each plaintiff is represented by a lawyer with
offices in Chicago, Illinois, but that in each case he associates with him a St. Clair County, Illinois lawyer on a per
diem basis.
4. That the residence and place of accident of each
plaintiff and the distance from the County Seat of St. Clair
County, Illinois, is as follows :
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No. of Case

12263
14343
14342
13751
11003
13383
13521
12317
13751

Pl. Residence

Little Rock, Ark.
Kansas City, Mo.
Little Rock, Ark.
Little Rock, Ark.
Kansas City, :Mo.
Fort Smith, Ark.
Hope, Ark.
Osawatomie, Kans.
Little Rock, Ark.

Place of
Accident

Same
Same
Same
Same
Same
Same
Same
Same
Same

Mileage from
Belleville,
Ill.

300
300
300
300
300
375
470
'450
300

5. That there are no witnesses, parties, citizens, residents or taxpayers residing in St. Clair County, Illinois,
who have a real or material interest or who are involved in
any of the suits sought to be dismissed.
6. That in each case the additional cost to the defendant to try a case of this character in St. Clair County, Illinois,
over a County in the State where the accident occurred or
where the plaintiff resides will approximate Five Hundred
Dollars; that defendant, as well as the plaintiff, is at a disadvantage in trying a case in a foreign jurisdiction because
of the inability to compel unwilling witnesses to attend trial
and the unsatisfactory use of depositions at a trial. That
the additional cost to the plaintiff, and the difficulties which
sometimes beset him in a foreign jurisdiction often times
exceed any alleged advantages he purportedly receives in
choosing a forum so far from home, making the supposed
alluring advantage to him more illusory than real.
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7. That the St. Clair County Circuit Court is believed
to have the heaviest criminal, civil and chancery docket of
any County of the State, save Cook County. That the docket
has increased by sixty per cent over a comparable period
prior to the war. That a single presiding judge (the three
circuit Judges of this district alternating) did, during
1947 and 1948, dispose of cases as follows: 858 Law (jury
and non-jury), 982 chancery, 506 criminal, 170 habeas
corpus, 360 motions, decree modifications, citations, etc., and
210 probation hearings. That from January 1, 1948, to
September 21, 1948, 1025 new law chancery and criminal
cases were filed. That on the last mentioned date there were
on file and undisposed of 1334 cases, some of which cases
where jury trials were requested were on file more than
eighteen months. That in a large majority of said pending
cases St. Clair County was and is the only county of venue
and the witnesses and parties are residents and taxpayers
of the County.
8. That for the past year St. Clair County has been
in a critical financial plight. That jurors are now being paid
by vouchers due, but not necessarily payable, in December,
1949.
9. That many cases similar to those here sought to be
dismissed have in the past three years been brought in the
St. Clair County Circuit Court by the present counsel for
the respective plaintiffs. That the usual time required for
trial of such a case is two to four court days. That such
trial results in no benefit to any resident or taxpayer of St.
Clair County, but instead, because of the congestion of the
docket, prevents the trial of two or more cases where purely
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